Using ASAN as a protection

AddressSanitizer, or ASAN, is an excellent tool for detecting subtle memory errors at runtime in C / C++ programs. It is now a productionized option in both the clang and gcc compilers, and has assisted in uncovering literally thousands of security bugs.

ASAN works by instrumenting compiled code with careful detections for runtime errors. It is primarily a detection tool. But what if we attempted to use is as a tool for protection?

The case for using ASAN-compiled software as a protection is an interesting one. Some of the most severe vulnerabilities are memory corruptions used to completely compromise a victim's machine. This is particularly the case for a web browser. If an ASAN-compiled build can help defend against these bugs, perhaps it has value to some users? An ASAN build is slower enough that no production software is likely to ship compiled with ASAN. But the slow down is not so bad that a particularly paranoid user wouldn't be able to easily accept it on a fast machine.

With that trade-off in mind, let's explore: does ASAN actually provide protection? To answer that, let's break memory corruption down into common vulnerability classes:

1. Linear buffer overflow (heap, stack, BSS, etc.)
A linear buffer overflow is one where every byte past the end of a buffer is written in sequence, up to some end point (example). For example, a memcpy() or strcpy() based overflow is linear. Because of the way ASAN works, I believe it will always catch a linear buffer overflow. It uses a default "redzone" of at least 16 bytes, i.e. touching _any_ address within 16 bytes of a valid buffer will halt the program with an error. Under ASAN, a linear buffer overflow condition will always hit the redzone.
This is great news because linear buffer overflows are one of the more common types of security bugs, and they are quite serious, affording the attacker a lot of control in corrupting program state.

2. Non-linear buffer overflow
A non-linear buffer overflow is one where data is written at some specific (but often attacker-controlled) out-of-bounds offset relative to a buffer (example). These bugs can be extremely powerful. Unfortunately, because of their power, they are both favored by attackers and also not stopped by ASAN if the attacker knows they are targeting an ASAN build. Example C program:

int main()
{
  char* p = malloc(16);
  char* p2 = malloc(16);
  printf("p, p2: %p, %pn", p, p2);
  p2[31] = '';
}
Compile it with ASAN (clang -fsanitize=address) and then run it and no error will be detected. The bad dereference "jumps over" the redzone to corrupt p2 via pointer p.

3. Use-after-free / double-free
ASAN does detect use-after-frees very reliably in the conditions that matter for current use cases: normal usage, and under fuzzing. However, if the attacker is specifically targeting an exploit against an ASAN build, they can pull tricks to still attempt the exploit. By churning the memory allocator hard (as is trivially possible with JavaScript), the condition can be hidden. Example C program:

int main()
{
   int n = 257 * 1024 * 1024;
   char* p2;
   char* p = malloc(1024);
   printf("p: %pn", p);
   free(p);
   while (n) {
     p2 = malloc(1024);
     if (p2 == p) printf("reused!!n");
     free(p2);
     n -= 1024;
   }
   n = 30 * 1024 * 1024;
   while (n) {
     p2 = malloc(1024);
     if (p2 == p) printf("reused!!n");
     n -= 1024;
   }
   p[0] = 'A';
}

4. Uninitialized value
Uninitialized values are harder to categorize. The impact varies drastically depending on where the uninitialized value is a pointer or an integer. For example, for an uninitialized pointer, effects similar to "non-linear buffer overflow" might even apply. Or if the uninitialized value is a copy length then perhaps it's more similar to "linear buffer overflow".
Or, if it's an uninitialized raw function pointer, that's a bigger problem. Indirect jumps are not checked. The behavior of the following ASAN-compiled program is instructive (run it in the debugger):

void subfunc1()
{
  unsigned long long blah = 0x0000414141414141ull;
}

void subfunc2()
{
  int (*funcptr)(void);
  funcptr();
}

int main()
{
  subfunc1();
  subfunc2();
}
5. Bad cast
The effects of a bad cast are fairly varied! Perhaps the bad cast involves mistakenly using an integer value as a pointer. In this instance, effects similar to "non-linear buffer overflow" might be achievable. Or perhaps if a pointer for a C++ object is expected, but it is mistaken with a pointer to a raw buffer, then a bad vtable gets used, leading to program flow subversion. One final C++ example to illustrate this. Run under ASAN to observe a raw crash trying to read a vtable entry from 0x0000414141414141:

class A
{
public:
  long long val;
};

class B
{
public:
  virtual void vfunc() {};
};

int main()
{
  class A a;
  a.val = 0x0000414141414141ull;
  class B* pb = (class B*) &a;
  pb->vfunc();
}


Safer ASAN?
There's certainly scope for a safer variant of ASAN, specifically designed to provide safety rather than detection. It would be based on various changes:

• Change the dereference check from "is this dereference address ok?" to "is this address in bounds for this specific pointer?". This takes care of the nasty "non-linear buffer overflow" as well as some of the worst effects of bad casts. This is not an easy change.
• Initialize more variables: pointer values on the stack and heap. (This is not as easy as it sounds, particularly for the heap case, where the casting operator may become a point of action.)
• Make the quarantine size for use-after-free unlimited. This burns a lot of memory, of course, but may be acceptable if fully unused pages are returned to the system with madvise() or even a crazy remap_file_pages() trick.

Remaining risks

Of course, even a "safer ASAN" build would not be bullet-proof. Taking the specific case of an safer-ASAN compiled Chromium, there would still be additional attacks possible: